Abstract: Rebel organizations regularly provide public services to citizens, even as they primarily focus on fighting. Existing scholarship documents many predictors of insurgent service provision, but the downstream effects of these activities remain unclear. This study examines Taliban judicial activity in Afghanistan, using a difference-in-differences design to find that Taliban courts significantly reduced the frequency of major disputes, especially around property, in districts where they operated. We find a corresponding reduction in survey-reported citizen willingness to use government courts, and a major increase in approval for Taliban rule. Finally, we find that the Taliban were able to increase bombings and other attacks against government and foreign troops. Together, the results indicate that rebel courts, if competent, can significantly sway public opinion and enhance the fighting capacity of rebels. These findings also help to explain the Taliban's rapid takeover of Afghanistan in the wake of US and NATO withdrawal from the country.

Abstract: Prevalent counterinsurgency theories posit that small development aid projects can help stabilize regions in conflict. A widely assumed mechanism runs through citizen attitudes, often known as “winning hearts and minds.” In this formulation, aid leads to economic benefits and sways public perceptions about the government, leading to more cooperation and eventually to less violence. Following a pre-registered research design, we test this claim using a difference-in-differences approach. We leverage original survey data and new geo-coded information about small German-sponsored infrastructure projects in northern Afghanistan. We find that aid improves perceived economic conditions, but erodes attitudes towards government and improves perceptions of insurgents. This finding challenges the “heart and minds” theory, but comple- ments the wider literature on legitimacy in developing states, suggesting that providing public goods improves legitimacy only when done transparently and accountably. We test alternative mechanisms, finding evidence that aid gatekeeping and credit claiming by insurgents are occurring.

Abstract: Recent studies have shown that sharing politician or bureaucrat performance information with voters seldom succeed at generating substantial bottom-up pressure and improved government performance. This study tests whether instead equipping local elites with information about the procedural workings of decentralized political processes allows them to participate more effectively and generate accountability pressure. A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that this information can sometimes have unintended effects on participation, government performance and protest. This study finds that training workshops in fact reduce participation in local ``participatory budgeting" processes, reduce confidence in local institutions and increase support for civil unrest as a tool for sanctioning politicians. Although the intervention increases the initiation of recalls for poor-performing mayors, these mayors respond to the recall threat by further reducing their effort. The evidence indicates that high expectations about the functioning of local democracy, when not met in practice, prompt a strategic withdrawal from poorly perceived processes and into direct action.

Abstract: Community information sharing is crucial to a government’s ability to respond to a disaster or a health emergency, such as a pandemic. In conflict zones, however, citizens and local leaders often lack trust in state institutions and are unwilling to cooperate, risking costly delays and information gaps. We report results from a randomized experiment in the Philippines regarding government efforts to provide services and build trust with rural communities in a conflict-affected region. We find that the outreach program increased the probability that village leaders provide time-sensitive pandemic risk information critical to the regional Covid-19 Task Force by 20%. The effect is largest for leaders who, at baseline, were skeptical about government capacity and fairness and had neutral or positive attitudes towards rebels. A test of mechanisms suggests that treated leaders updated their beliefs about government competence and shows that neither security improvement nor project capture by the rebels are primary drivers. These findings highlight the important role that government efforts to build connections with conflict-affected communities can play in determining public health outcomes during times of national emergencies.

Abstract: Recently, populists have won elections campaigning on constitutionally dubious and norm-defying policy proposals. Although effective at mobilizing support, these policies are difficult to implement in practice without allies throughout the political system. Examining Duterte’s brutal “War on Drugs” in the Philippines, we find that mayors excluded from estab- lishment patronage networks filled the gap. These outsider mayors received 40 percent lower public works appropriations, and, in turn, executed Duterte’s drug war more aggressively. Outsider-led municipalities had 40 percent more anti-drug incidents and 60 percent more extra-judicial killings by police. This illustrates an important trade-off between corruption (politics-as-usual) and violent democratic backsliding.

Abstract: Natural resource extraction is economically important in many developing countries, but social conflict can threaten the viability of the sector. This paper examines why polluting extractive industries sometimes generate social mobilization but often do not. First, I distinguish acute, highly visible environmental externalities from chronic, less observable pollution, showing that only the former generate social mobilization. Second, I explore how high quality local governance can mitigate the local resource curse dynamic by both reducing pollution and improving compensation in mining-intensive areas. The analysis uses micro-level data on extractive commodities, water pollution, children's and livestock health, local government quality and mining-related social conflict in Peru to demonstrate the full causal pathway of the local resource curse.
Coverage: Washington Post

Abstract: Democratic transitions are often followed by conflict. In this paper we explore one explanation for this fighting: the military’s strategic use of violence to retain control of economically valuable regions. We find evidence of this dynamic in Myanmar, a country transitioning from four decades of military rule. Fearing that the new civilian government will assert authority over jade mining, the military initiates violence in mining townships to deter civilian control. Using geocoded data on conflict and jade mines, we find support for this argument: as Myanmar starts to transition in 2011, we observe a sharp increase in conflicts involving the military in jade-mining areas. We address alternative explanations, including a nationwide shift in the military’s strategy, the co-location of mines and military headquarters, commodity prices, opposition to a controversial dam, and trends specific to Kachin State. We substantiate the theoretical claim that outgoing generals use instability to retain rents — a winning strategy where plausible challenges to state authority provide pretense for asserting military control over lucrative territory.

Abstract: Dissident violence inflicts many costs on society, but some of the longest‐lasting consequences for civilians may be indirect, due to the government's response. We explore how government policy responses affect social welfare, specifically through budgetary shifts. Using subnational violence and budgeting data for Peru, we demonstrate that attacks on soldiers during the budget negotiation period drive a shift from local social services, especially health, to defense. One soldier fatality implies a 0.13 percentage point reduction in the local health budget share (2008–12). Health budget cuts due to a single soldier fatality result in 76 predicted additional infant deaths 2 years later. We show that the effect on health budgeting operates through decreases in women's use of health facilities and postnatal services. We offer evidence that Peru's coercive response indirectly harms civilians due to butter‐to‐guns budgetary shifts. Our results identify a budgetary mechanism that translates dissident violence into a deterioration in social welfare.
Coverage: Axios ; Nature Human Behaviour 'Research Highlight' ; Political Violence at a Glance

Abstract: Findings in political science, economics and security studies suggest that during civil war aid can be used to help establish control of contested areas and reduce levels of insurgent violence by winning the “hearts and minds” of the population. These accounts typically ignore the strategic implications of aid distribution by pro-government forces, namely that rebel groups should resist the implementation of aid projects that would undermine their position. Using a new dataset of fine-grained and geo-located violence incidents in Afghanistan and random variation in the administration of some US counter-insurgency aid, I show that insurgents strategically respond to counter-insurgency aid in contested districts by resisting through violent means. The results indicate that civilian aid only reduces insurgent violence when distributed in districts already controlled by pro-government forces; when allocated to contested districts civilian aid in fact causes a significant increase in insurgent violence. The results also indicate that the effect of counterinsurgency aid on violence varies by project type, and can be overwhelmed by macro-level strategic changes in the conflict.
Coverage: Washington Post ; U.S. Institute of Peace